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ABSTRACT 
Engaging in exploration and exploitation is essential to business survival and performance. 
While firms manage exploration and exploitation alliances for the long-term, how prepared are 
they for sudden shocks in the short-term? We address this question in the context of a unique and 
opportune natural experiment associated with the 2008 financial crisis. Our analysis of 155 new 
biopharmaceutical ventures over a seven-year period suggests that exploration alliances – with a 
long-term orientation – make a firm more vulnerable to external shocks. In contrast, exploitation 
alliances as well as a balance between exploration and exploitation alliances – which underlie 
short-term performance – enable the firm to sustain external shocks.  
 
Keywords: external shocks, new venture survival, exploration, exploitation, alliances and 
biotechnology 
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Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 contains a stark contrast between its sudden, unexpected 
onset and its obviousness in retrospect, laid out in numerous analyses highlighting its 
inevitability. This contrast has been popularized by the notion of Black Swans, i.e. 
unanticipatable events with extreme impact that are relatively easy to explain retrospectively 
(Taleb, 2007). Such events expose a significant rift between theory and practice of business and 
management. On the one hand, they are normally treated as unusual events, buried in the extreme 
but very thin tails of a presumed normal distribution of environmental shocks. Indeed, as 
important and consequential such events may be, they should be weighed down by a rational 
decision maker given the assumed rarity of their occurrence.  As such, their expected impact is, 
in theory, minuscule and thus relatively safe to ignore by a rational decision maker. On the other 
hand, in practice, their actual impact is significant, with long-term reverberations. Moreover, 
recent writings suggest that economic crises occur much more frequently than a normal 
probability distribution would suggest (Krugman, 2008; Taleb, 2007).  
Survival over the long term is a fundamental goal for firms; it looms large in the 
evolution and change in business environments that challenge firms to adapt (Levinthal, 1994). 
However given that the short term of focus of many venture capital backed firms, exit via 
flotation and / or friendly mergers and acquisitions (M&A) based on superior short-term 
performance may also represent an attractive option. In view of this, the literature has 
emphasized the importance of engaging in both exploration and exploitation activities as a means 
of balancing short-term performance and long-term survival (March, 1991). This represents a 
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particular challenge for new high-technology ventures that often lack the resources to develop 
new products and thus keep up with the pace of change (Venkataraman et al., 1990). For such 
ventures, strategic alliances represent an important mechanism for ensuring innovative output 
(Baum et al., 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1996). In line with the exploration-exploitation dilemma, 
some alliances aim to exploit existing capabilities, while others aim to explore new opportunities 
(Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lee et al., 2012). Both types of alliances play a vital role in sustaining a 
system of new product development, particularly for smaller firms (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004).  However, given the different nature of these alliances, the question arises of whether and 
how they matter for firm survival in the face of an external economic shock.  
In this paper, we address this question in the context of a unique and opportune natural 
experiment associated with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, deemed by many the worst since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. A survey of firms conducted in 2006, with no anticipation of 
what was to come, aimed to examine factors that contributed to firms’ long-term prospects. After 
the crisis, in 2012, this became an opportunity to assess the survival of these firms following this 
extraordinary and unanticipated short-term shock. We distinguish alliances on the basis of their 
exploration vs. exploitation focus, with the former focusing on longer-term prospects and the 
latter on more immediate product commercialization outcomes. Our analysis of the survival of 
155 new ventures in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries over the 2006-2012 period 
shows that ventures that failed had tended to have a higher number of exploration alliances and a 
lower number of exploitation alliances.  
Our work raises important theoretical and managerial questions. First, while current 
theory on firms’ adaptation to environmental changes (business turnaround) is concerned 
predominantly with the perils of long-term survival and the exploratory behavior necessary to 
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overcome it (Cyert and March, 1963; Bourgeois, 1981; Lavie et al., 2011), our work suggests 
that short-term disruptions should constitute a more prominent angle in our theories. Second, our 
work enhances the understanding of the performance consequences of strategic behaviors in 
recession conditions, where market selection pressures are less forgiving than those in buoyant 
conditions. Our findings demonstrate that there are distinct resource considerations for the short-
term that can help contribute to the firm’s survival in the wake of short-term shocks. Finally, 
whilst prior work on the balance of exploration and exploitation in alliance formation 
emphasizes its importance on the basis of ensuring long-term survival, our work suggests that 
short-term survival is an equally vital consideration. Additionally emphasis on long-term strategy 
of biopharmaceutical firms overlooks a more venture capital driven strategy that may encourage 
early acquisition of the firm in the form of trade sale. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Exploration, Exploitation, and Strategic Alliances 
March (1991, 1995) links adaptations at firm level to changes occurring at the level of the 
organizational population through a model of exploration and exploitation in organizational 
learning. He described exploration as “experimentation with new alternatives” having returns 
that “are uncertain, distant, and often negative”, and exploitation as “the refinement and 
extension of existing competencies, technologies, and paradigms” exhibiting returns that “are 
positive, proximate, and predictable” (p. 85).  However, refining exploitation more rapidly than 
exploration may exhaust a firm’s opportunities and render its competencies obsolete (March, 
1991).  The survival of the firm thus depends on its ability to “engage in enough exploitation to 
ensure the organisation’s current viability and engage in enough exploration to ensure its future 
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viability” (Levinthal and March, 1993: 105). These two activities are difficult to balance since 
exploration of new alternatives slows down the process of exploiting existing ones; and 
improvement in competence at existing procedures makes experimentation with others less 
attractive (Levitt and March, 1988). 
Exploration-exploitation choices are readily applicable to strategic alliances, defined as 
voluntarily initiated inter-firm cooperative agreements that involve contributions by partners 
reflected in exchange, sharing or co-development of capital, technology, knowledge or other 
firm-specific assets (Gulati, 1995). A firm’s choice of the type of alliances to enter can be 
distinguished by its motivation to either explore for new opportunities or exploit existing 
capabilities (Koza and Lewin, 1998). From this viewpoint, exploration alliances are established 
with the motivation to discover something new and they focus on the ‘R’ in the research and 
development process. They support technological or product innovation with an emphasis on 
generating new knowledge and social capital, which allows the firm to acquire new capabilities, 
therefore enhance its future viability (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Mowery et al., 1996). Alternatively, exploitation alliances focus on the ‘D’ in the research and 
development process and are established with the goal to join existing competencies across 
organizational boundaries in order to generate synergies, which are then shared across the 
partners. They support product commercialization with a strong focus on leveraging existing 
knowledge and relationships (Deeds and Rothaermel, 2003), which allows a firm to achieve 
short-term efficiency by generating immediate benefits, therefore improving its current viability.  
Exploration and exploitation alliances are particularly prevalent in the biotechnology 
industry (George et al., 2001) and play a crucial role in the process of developing new products 
(Deeds and Hill, 1996; Dowling and Helm, 2006; Gerwin, 2004; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). 
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It is very unlikely for a new venture to possess the necessary resources and capabilities to 
develop products entirely on their own (Azzone and Dalla Pozza, 2003; Amir-Aslani and 
Negassi, 2006; Tucker et al., 2012), due mainly to their liability of newness and relatively small 
size (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965).  
Engagement in both types of alliance activities also allows startup biopharmaceutical 
firms to overcome such liabilities by tapping into partners’ resource networks and making 
extensive use of their manufacturing facilities, distribution channels and customer bases (Fosfuri 
and Tribó, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Miller, 2004). In return, large incumbent firms 
can gain access to start-ups’ technologies and make use of their external knowledge and 
expertise (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006; Diestre and 
Najagopalan, 2012). More importantly, exploration and exploitation alliances can provide the 
funding for a startup to develop its drug to the stage at which an established company deems it 
worthwhile to acquire it even though a commercial drug has yet to be generated (Namara and 
Baden-fuller, 2007; Diestre and Najagopalan, 2012). For most young biopharmaceutical 
companies, such alliances represent their major source of funding in addition to equity 
investments prior to a positive exit such as IPOs (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011, Niosi, 2003).   
In the case of the Global Financial Crisis and tightening resources, access to other 
sources of funding such as venture capital (VC) becomes ever harder, specifically as the VC 
sector is  increasingly reluctant to gamble on drug development projects in the hostile financial 
climate (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). 
The situation deteriorates due to the high risk, capital-intensive nature of the biopharmaceutical 
sector. To survive under such scenarios, start-up biopharmaceutical firms often lack the 
resources necessary to contend with major environmental shifts (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 
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2006), despite of their strategic flexibility (Raynor and Leroux, 2004), Thus, exploitation and 
exploitation alliances may provide an attractive option to contend with unexpected hostile 
external shocks, as such alliances provide start-up biopharmaceutical firms with funding or 
income as well as direct resource access from alliance partners, which can be used to buffer the 
negative impact of sudden hostile shocks (Meyer, 1982; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). 
Maintaining a balance between exploration and exploitation is vital for a new venture’s 
survival and prosperity: firms that engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation suffer 
the costs of experimentation without gaining the benefits associated with exploiting extant 
opportunities, and may end up with undeveloped ideas and missed opportunities (March, 1991). 
Equally, firms that exploit to the exclusion of exploration become trapped in suboptimal 
equilibrium which makes adaptation difficult as current opportunities become exhausted and 
existing competences obsolete (Levinthal and March, 1993). In terms of strategic alliances, new 
ventures that focus excessively on exploration alliances forgo the opportunities that cannot be 
efficiently tapped by its internal organization as a result of limited market access. Likewise, a 
new venture that relies excessively on exploitation alliances may fail to internalize external 
knowledge that cannot be developed internally (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery et al., 1996; 
Rothaermel, 2001). Hence, an alliance portfolio that excessively emphasizes exploration or 
exploitation is sub-optimal (Lavie et al., 2011; Hoffmann, 2007). The two types of alliance 
complement one another along the firm’s value chain (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
 
External Shocks 
External shocks and their impact on firms have drawn the attention of organization and 
innovation scholars. Shepherd et al (2000) define shocks as an exogenous event that alters the 
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overall degree of novelty at a point in time; by contrast, Venkataraman and Van de Ven (1998) 
view an external shock as a low probability but high consequence event with an adverse 
economic impact. The occurrence of an external shock is therefore difficult to predict and its 
impact on firms is disruptive and potentially inimical. External shocks present both danger and 
opportunities (Starbuck et al., 1978). An external shock has direct influence on the potential 
customers, immediately inhibits a new venture’s potential sales and ways of exit. On the other 
hand however, new opportunities may be concomitantly created as the external environment 
redefines attractive market positions (Meyer et al., 1990).  
External shocks dramatically alter the competitive and operating conditions of an 
environment (Sine and David, 2003). Due to their liabilities of newness and relatively small size 
(Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965), new ventures are particularly vulnerable to 
hostile external shocks, i.e. those shocks that shrink the economic opportunities for the 
population of ventures within an economic niche (Venkataraman and Van de Ven, 1998). As 
discussed above, alliances extend a new venture’s boundary so it can engage in value chain 
activities that are otherwise unavailable given its limited internal resources and market 
opportunities (Gulati, 1995; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). The resource dependency and 
information process theories suggest that the key theoretical motivation for alliances under 
increasing environmental uncertainty is to access partners’ resources and ensure necessary 
knowledge flows to reduce such uncertainty (Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Therefore, in the face of external shocks, the nature of the venture’s strategic alliances can 
be of pivotal importance for whether a new venture can withstand such shocks.  
On the other hand, alliances increase a new venture’s exposure to uncertainty arising 
from a partner’s future behavior. It may be challenging to accommodate each partner’s internal 
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threat rigidity and failing to do so may hinder the joint response to increasing environmental 
threats (Marino et al., 2002). In addition, over-relying on partners may lead to power imbalance, 
in particular when a new venture collaborates with large established firms. It is more likely that 
the stronger partners will wield more power which increases their potential for opportunism. 
These relational risks are rather predictable and can be minimized as alliance relationships 
develop. Moreover, it is very unlikely that such risks will have an immediate life threating effect 
on each partner. In contrast to relational risks, external shocks are unpredictable, when they 
coexist, uncertainty at the macro level overrides risks at the micro level, as environmental shocks 
are fatal to the vast majority of firms (Shepherd et al., 2000). Thus it is reasonable to assume that 
under sudden hostile shocks, firms' needs to secure necessary resources and information flows 
will outweigh the fear of relational uncertainty and will encourage their increasing external focus 
and alliance activities (Marino et al., 2008). Empirical studies show that emerging market firms 
increasingly engage in partnership activities with a purpose to cope with uncertainty resulting 
from major economic changes (Peng and Heath, 1996; Hitt et al., 2004). However, it is likely 
that external shocks may amplify a new venture’s relational risks if the firm is overly dependent 
on one or a set of partners, who fail due to external shocks.  
 
Hypotheses 
Prior studies suggest that firms tend to invest more in exploration activities under perceived 
gradual shifts in the macro environment, as it increases the rate of innovation required for longer-
term survival (Lant and Mezias, 1992). However, focus on exploration alliances can be 
detrimental to a new venture’s survival in the wake of unexpected external shocks such as a 
financial crisis (Jansen et al., 2006; Shepherd et al., 2000). Because exploration alliances entail 
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gradual and continuous investments with a long payoff horizon and uncertain outcomes (i.e. 
scientific breakthroughs), they are particularly vulnerable to the liquidity constraints following a 
financial crisis as such constraints threaten the firm’s continued commitment to the alliances. 
After a negative shock, the level of resource munificence is generally lower and a firm’s ability 
to reduce uncertainty in production and market is significantly restricted (Shepherd et al., 2000). 
In addition, to the extent that a crisis disrupts the current order in the industry, the long-term 
prospects of an exploration alliance may be undermined by the degrading of the new knowledge 
it generates (Kim and Rhee, 2009; Levinthal and Posen, 2009; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2013). It is 
likely that more advanced knowledge may come out before such new knowledge has been 
applied in a specific product prototype and finally commercialized in the marketplace.  
To deal with such situations, firms may adopt retrenchment strategies, such as 
terminating R&D projects, significant cut down of R&D budgets and delay of new product 
development. However, a new product may miss the right timing for its specific market and fail 
to be commercialized eventually. Exploration alliances formed with the purpose of developing 
such products may collapse due to being unable to meet their anticipated goals (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Saxton, 1997). The cost of engaging in undermined exploration alliances and 
failing is not recoupable, and may be greater than the cost of not pursuing such activities under 
unexpected external shocks, specifically when the failure of such alliances carries debt 
obligations beyond the firms’ short term debt paying ability. As a result, new ventures that are 
counterparties to such alliances may be deprived of critical funds that sustain their ongoing 
operations. In addition, the benefits of exploration alliances such as learning and knowledge 
accumulation, are less imminent to a new venture in the face of a sudden hostile shock than 
instant profits, which have immediate value to its continuous survival in the short-term. 
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H1: Exploration alliances increase new ventures’ likelihood of failure following a hostile 
external shock. 
Exploitation alliances focus on the downstream activities of the value chain (clinical 
trials, FDA regulatory process and marketing and sales) with a strong market orientation (Kohli 
and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990). Investment in exploitation alliances can make a 
new venture more resilient to immediate changes in the business environment. Because firms 
with an emphasis on marketing as opposed to other business functions are more sensitive to the 
impact of external shocks that may potentially jeopardize business survival, and this enables 
them to make timely internal adjustments to counteract reduction in demand (Pearce and 
Michael, 1997).   
Sudden hostile shocks imply looming loss and a loss of control over operational decisions 
and outcomes. From a threat-rigidity perspective (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992, Staw et al., 1981), 
exploitation alliances allow new ventures to engage in risk-averse activities by focusing on tried 
and tested competencies with more predictable outcomes that limit potential loss (Voss et al., 
2008). External shocks can create opportunities for new ventures with a strong orientation on 
product commercialization in their alliance portfolios, as the turmoil can make customers 
dissatisfied and more willing to switch suppliers. This can lower the level of market uncertainty 
(e.g. the market entry barriers) for a new venture and thus dampen its liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). In addition to adaptability to changes and provision of new opportunities, 
new ventures salvage their past investments by exploiting existing knowledge and leveraging 
past experience via exploitation alliances. From a resource based perspective, financial returns 
achieved through exploitation alliances though not sustainable in the long run, provide 
immediately available resources that would allow firms to act faster in response to unexpected 
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external shocks in the short term (Hambrick and D’ Aveni, 1988; Bourgeois, 1981). Thus, the 
ability to tap into a firm’s available resources is crucial not only to cushion the sudden impact of 
a shock but also to quickly capture the newly created opportunities by the shock (Cyert and 
March, 1963).   
H2: Exploitation alliances reduce new ventures’ likelihood of failure following a hostile 
external shock. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 naturally raise the question of what happens when firms engage in 
both exploration and exploitation. A balance between exploration and exploitation alliances may 
also allow a new venture to adapt external shocks through exploiting existing assets and 
positions in a profit producing way and simultaneously to explore new technologies and markets. 
The balance enables the new venture to enjoy synergies by leveraging value chain 
complementarities across its partners (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). For example a new venture 
can commercialize products by exploiting some of its partner’s market access and production 
facilities based on knowledge acquired from some of its other partners. From a resilience 
perspective, a new venture becomes more robust through the accumulation of resources 
generated via exploitation alliances which can be used immediately to absorb stress caused by 
sudden hostile shocks; equally, exploration alliances enhance the new venture’s capability to 
bounce back from these shocks by transforming itself (Moberg and Folke, 1999). Although 
achieving such a balance is difficult due to tradeoffs in resource allocation and internal conflicts 
associated with the use of inconsistent organizational routines (Lavie et al., 2011), these 
difficulties may be less applicable to new ventures. Given its limited internal resources and 
reliance on internal value chain activities, a new venture may depend on alliance partners for 
both exploratory R&D activities and exploitative marketing or production activities and become 
	14 
	
more vested in its alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). In addition, a new venture enjoys 
sufficient strategic flexibility and is more responsive and agile when attempting to balance its 
exploration and exploitation efforts, due to its flat organizational structure. Accordingly, a new 
venture would face limited inertial pressures when employing different procedures or adjusting 
its routines when engaging in R&D versus marketing or production alliances. Its partnering 
routines therefore become sufficiently flexible to enable it to effectively balance exploration and 
exploitation in alliances with less friction. 
 Engagement with exploration alliances increases a new venture’s ability to detect 
tremors and prepare for external shocks (Meyer, 1982). It allows the new venture to capitalize on 
the emerging opportunities for organizational learning created by the external shocks, and 
implement unrelated changes (such as the termination of the bad relationships), which makes the 
firm more resilient to external shocks. However exploration alliances also represent a source of 
risk to the venture during external shocks, as the costs of undertaking such activities can be 
greater than the profit they generate. Concurrent engagement with exploitation alliances can 
generate immediate income or slack resources that can be used to buffer visceral components, 
safeguard brittle linkages, and conserve scarce resources which temporally insulates a new 
venture from external shocks and fuels adaptive responses to them (Meyer, 1982; Cybert and 
March, 1963).  
Overall, in facing an external shock a firm engaging in both exploration and exploitation 
alliances would experience the pros and cons of each. Given the individual arguments giving rise 
to Hypotheses 1 and 2, there is no basis for arguing a priori for a particular direction of the 
combined effect of engaging in exploration and exploitation alliances. As a result, we propose 
the following set of competing hypotheses:  
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H3a: The balance between exploration and exploitation alliances reduces new ventures’ 
likelihood of failure following a hostile external shock.  
H3b: The balance between exploration and exploitation alliances increases new 
ventures’ likelihood of failure following a hostile external shock.  
	
Data and Methods 
Original Sample and Data Collection 
We focus on the biopharmaceutical sector in particular, as past studies have emphasized the 
importance of inter-firm collaboration in new product development, and the particularly costly 
and risky nature of this process in biopharmaceutical firms (Pisano, 1990; Ernst and Young, 
2006). The objective of our original data collection was to obtain information on the absorptive 
capacity, open innovation activities and growth of representative groups of biopharmaceutical 
firms from the US and three major European economies (i.e. France, Germany and the UK). 
Separate exercises were undertaken to define target populations for the company survey in 
Europe and the US. In the US, we obtained information on firms in the broader biotechnology 
sector from the Bioscan industry directory1 (see also Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2004; Zollo et al., 2002). For the European economies the target group was based on the 
data provided by Biotechnology-Europe.com2 which is the most comprehensive list of firms in 
the European biotechnology industry. 	
Once a comprehensive list of biotechnology firms had been identified we reviewed each 
firm’s product profile and verified their inclusion in our final list of biopharmaceutical firms. We 
also excluded service firms (e.g. consultancies, technology transfer organizations, incubator 
																																																						
1 BioWorld, Atlanta, USA. 
2 Biotechnology World, Warsaw, Poland.	
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centers, investors in biotechnology companies) at this point as well as organizations that were 
active in the bio-pharmaceutical sector but which were not formal legal entities. This resulted in 
a US target group of 999 biopharmaceutical firms, and a European target group of 1,099 firms 
(343 English companies, 247 French companies and 509 German companies). 	
Once the target groups of biopharmaceutical firms had been identified each company was 
approached by telephone to confirm contact details, explain the purpose of this research, and 
encourage their participation in the study. Survey design was informed by inductive interviews 
with six R&D managers from five English biopharmaceutical firms. These interviews which 
lasted 40-90 minutes each helped to clarify key concepts and verify the transparency of metrics 
for absorptive capacity, open innovation, etc. Further verification of the questionnaire design was 
provided by a pilot postal survey covering 75 Irish biopharmaceutical companies to pre-test the 
initial design for the English language questionnaire. Following some minor changes to the 
English language questionnaire, French and German versions were developed. In each case 
questionnaires were cross-translated by two different translators and any differences in meaning 
were resolved.  
The main survey was administered to the final target list of 2,173 US and European 
biopharmaceutical firms between June and October 2006. An initial mail shot including freepost 
response envelopes, was followed-up after two weeks by telephone and a further mailing. 
Finally, we obtained useful responses from 349 biopharmaceutical firms, an overall response rate 
of 16.1 per cent. Individual country response rates were:  US, 14.4 per cent, Europe 17.5 per cent 
(UK 23.9 per cent, France 14.2 per cent, Germany 14.0 per cent and Ireland 22.7 per cent). The 
average respondent firm had 47 employees, with US firms being larger (average 65 employees) 
than those in the EU countries (35 employees).  
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The Natural Experiment Afforded by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
As a hostile exogenous shock that is widely acknowledged as the worst since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Reuters, 2008; Haidar, 2012), the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
provides an ideal natural experiment to examine our research questions (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; 
Wan and Yiu, 2009). Brewing for a while, the crisis started to show its effects in the middle of 
2007 and into 2008. As shown in Figure 1, the GDP growth of the four study countries dropped 
significantly and plunged to the historically lowest points in the first quarter of 2008. Though a 
sharper rise was seen in the following period, cresting around mid-2009, the growth rates of all 
four economies slowly declined again soon afterwards. This trend is closely mirrored by the 
stock value of the global biotechnology industry: for example, a significant drop in the NASDQ 
Biotechnology Index (NBI) can be clearly identified between September 2008 and March 2009 
(Figure 2). 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1& 2 here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis played a significant role in the failure of major businesses, 
decline in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of US dollars, and a downturn in economic 
activity leading to the 2008-2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign 
debt crisis (Baily and Elliot, 2009; Williams, 2012). The resulting ‘credit crunch’ significantly 
slowed venture capital fundraising for technology-based start-ups such as new biopharmaceutical 
ventures since 2007 (BVCA, 2009; NVCA, 2009; World Bank, 2009), as investors became more 
cautious in committing money to venture capital funds. The following recession impacted sales 
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growth for many start-ups, the timeline to profitability, and hence amount of funding required. In 
the meantime, the economic downturn provided cost effective opportunities to invest in new or 
disruptive technologies spinning out from the science base. The booming clean energy 
investment and associated high level of investor enthusiasm for the sector provide some evidence 
to support this proposition (Makower et al., 2007).  
We examine only the period of the Global Financial Crisis in this study for several 
reasons. First, the Global Financial Crisis created a series of subsequent shocks such as the 
follow on economic crisis, as well as changes in government spending, regulations and financial 
availability, etc. We separate them from the financial crisis itself, as the effects of these 
subsequent shocks are dramatic and still on-going at the time of our study. Second, capital-raised 
declined sharply during the crisis period as a result of a sharp rise in the equity risk premium (the 
risk premium of equities over bonds) causing the cost of capital to rise, private investment to fall. 
Biotechnology companies in the US and Europe raised US$16 billion in 2008, a 46% decline 
from 2007. IPO funding fell 95% to US$116 million (Ernst & Young, 2009). This systemic and 
protracted funding drought placed the business model that fueled biotech growth for the past 
three decade under unprecedented strain. To survive in this environment, firms may need to 
restructure operations and use deals creatively, as well as bring the creativity that has long been 
the industry’s hallmark to establishing more durable models for funding innovation, e.g. via 
more creative development partnerships.  
We focus on new ventures within our original sample, defined as those less than 10 years 
old at the time of the crisis (Shepherd, 1999; Certo et al., 2001; Covin and Slevin, 1990; 
Sigmund et al., 2015).  We consider this as appropriate in the context of our study as it usually 
takes at least 10 years for a biopharmaceutical company to bring a new drug from discovery to 
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FDA approval - a time horizon that captures the transition from a new venture to an established 
business. This yielded a final sample of 155 new ventures out of a list of 349 biopharmaceutical 
firms included in the original sample. We collected further information on their latest survival 
status in 2012 from FAME3 (for the UK) and Thomson ONE4 (for France and Germany) using 
the company name identifiers. For respondent firms that could not be identified in these two 
databases, we collected the survival information from their official websites and/or industry 
newspapers such as Healthcare Industry Today5  and BioPortfolio6 . These data sources also 
helped us gather the latest information, for the firms that did survive the crisis, on their product 
portfolio, in particular the number of new product(s) on the market. Table 1 summarizes the 
observations and key variables in each of the three countries and the overall sample. In terms of 
the non-response bias, no significant differences are found between respondent and non-
respondent firms on firm size (p=0.35) and age (p=0.67). 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Survival Time 
We study the survival time from initial establishment until failure. The event of interest is firm 
exit by bankrupcy or liquidation (coded as 1). Exit by M&A is a competing event (coded as 2). 
From an investor and entrepreneur’s viewpoint, being acquired and/or merged is often viewed as 
success rather than failure given that a business is sold at or above its market value, because 
successful sale of the business allows investors and entrepreneurs to harvest from their 
investment. Specifically, during the period of the crisis, when world stock markets have been 
																																																						
3Bureau Van Duk, Brussels. 
4Thomson Reuters. New York. 
5IPD Group, Washington, USA. 
6Bioportfolio, Dorset, UK.	
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depressed, trade sales are usually considered as more desirable exit routes than flotations (Storey 
and Greene, 2010). This has led to acceleration of consolidation of the global biotechnology 
industry (Ernst and Young, 2009). As firms are at risk of failing all the time, in order to examine 
the net effect of the Global Financial Crisis on firm survival, we split each firm’s observation 
spell into three, with the dividing lines representing the onset and end of the Global Financial 
Crisis respectively. In this specification, the second observation spell, during of the crisis, 
represents the heightened hazard of failure triggered by the external economic shock. The first 
and last observation spells capture firm survivability before and after the crisis. Since the exact 
dates of exit were not precisely recorded in the database but the months were, we chose the 
month of exit as our time variable.  
We used September 2008 as the onset of the Global Financial Crisis for the purpose of 
this study, as according to the World Bank and NASDAQ official statistics, this was the time 
when the GDP growth of all our four study countries plunged into the undergrowth (Figure 1) 
and the market value of the global biotechnology industry begun to collapse below the 
historically lowest point since 2006 (Figure 2). Equally, June 2009 was considered as the end of 
most severe period of the crisis (Hulbert, 2010),  as GDP growth for the four countries in ours 
study climbed to its highest level since the onset of the crisis at this point (Figure 1), after which  
the growth of the market value of the global biotechnology industry took off (Figure 2). Unless 
firms failed before Sep 20087, the first spells were right censored and the actual outcomes were 
shown in the second spells, which capture whether the firms in the study survived the Global 
Financial Crisis. The last spells comprise those firms survived beyond the financial crisis. This 
organization of the data yielded a total of 430 observations (12 firms failed before September 
2008 + 143 firms × 2 periods + 132 firms).	
																																																						
7In our case, we found 12 such firms that failed between Jan 2006 and Sep 2008. 
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Model Specification 
We estimate the hazard rate using a Competing Risk Model (CRM) (Han and Hausman, 1990), 
as two types of exit forms are examined in this study, namely firm failure (bankruptcy or 
liquidation) and M&A. The model is based on Fine and Gray’s proportional hazard model and 
thus does not require any restrictive assumptions regarding the baseline hazard, such as a 
Weibull or lognormal specification. This allows us to account for the mode of exit in terms of 
bankruptcy or liquidation and M&A. The two outcomes are treated as independent so that the 
probability of the occurrence of one is assumed not to depend on the probability of the 
occurrence of another8. Thus, the discrete time formulation of the hazard of exit type j for firm i 
at duration t is denoted as ℎ"	 $%&"  and can be given by a complementary log logistic function as 
follows:   ℎ"	 $%&" = 1 − exp	{−exp	($′%"0& + 2& 3 )}                   (1) 
Where j=1 or 2, depending on the type of exit (bankruptcy or liquidation versus M&A); 
i=1, ..., n; t=1, …, T.  2&(3) is the baseline hazard function relating to the hazard rate ℎ"	 $%&"  at 
the tth interval with the spell duration (Jenkins, 1995). It is assumed to take the proportional form 
as 2& 3 = 	26 3 ∙ $′%"0& , where 26 3  is the baseline function, 0& is a vector of the regression 
parameters and $%"is a vector of covariates for firm (i). The vector $%" in our empirical model 
includes a range of time varying explanatory variables relating to the factors affecting firm 
survival, i.e. number of exploration or exploitation alliances, and the Global Financial Crisis. It 
																																																						
8To test whether these two exit types can be treated as independent, we performed a Hausman test and a Wald-test of 
equality for all parameters. The results from both tests confirmed the significant differences between these two 
forms of exit.	
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also includes control variables relating to the firm characteristics (such as age and R&D 
intensity) and strategic focus. These explanatory variables are effectively measured with a six-
year lag with respect to the dependent variable, since they were collected in the initial survey in 
2006 and firm survival status is updated in 2012. Each of the factors associated with firm 
survival is explained in more detail as follows.  
Measures 
Exploration and Exploitation Alliances. We measure exploration and exploitation alliances in 
which a biopharmaceutical firm engages along its value chain (Deeds and Hill, 2004; Xia and 
Roper, 2008).  Exploration alliances are a count variable of research based partnerships which 
focus on upstream activities in a biopharmaceutical firm’s value chain, i.e. basic research, drug 
discovery, preclinical development. Exploitation alliances are a count variable of marketing 
based partnerships that focus on downstream activities, i.e. clinical trials, FDA regulatory 
process, marketing and sales. In industries like the biopharmaceuticals, alliance activities are 
widely observed (George et al., 2001), and are seen as playing an important role in contributing 
to the survivability of new ventures (Dowling and Helm, 2006; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). 
Balance Between Exploraton and Exploitation Alliances. We measure the balance 
between exploraton and exploitation alliances by adopting the approach to measuring firm 
ambidexterity of exploratory and exploitative innovation, i.e. as a multidimensional construct 
comprising the non-substitutable combination of exploration and exploitation alliances (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2012). In practice, firm ambidexterity is operationalized as 
the multiplicative interaction of exploration and exploitation activities (Cao et al., 2009; Lavie et 
al., 2011; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004), as high levels of exploration and 
exploitation complement and augment the performance enhancing effect of each other (Cao et 
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al., 2009, Jansen et al., 2012). In order to address the facts that the simple multiplicative term is 
very sensitive to the total number of alliances and that it fails to account for the balance itself 
(e.g. 2x8 gives the same multiplicative score as 4x4), we divide the multiplicative term by the 
square of the average number of exploration / exploitation alliances. The intuition for this is that 
for a given total number of alliances, the multiplicative score is highest when the numbers of 
exploration and exploitation alliances are equal. Our measure thus ranges between 0 and 1 and 
represents the raw multiplicative score as a proportion of its maximum for the given number of 
alliances. In the above examples, for alliance numbers of 2 and 8, the balance measure yields a 
value of 0.64 (i.e. 2*8 / 52 ), while for alliance numbers of 4 and 4, the balance measure yields a 
value of 1. We note, however, that using the simple multiplicative term yields results consistent 
with those reported below. Global Financial Crisis. To capture the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis on the likelihood of firm survival, we included a crisis dummy variable 
reflecting the period during the Global Financial Crisis between September 2008 and June 2009 
(1 respresents the survival period between September 2008 and June 2009 and 0 otherwise). 
Control variables. In addition to the main variables of interest, we control for a number 
of other possible effects as captured by various relevant firm characteristics such as age, size, 
R&D intensity, location, strategic focus, and funding profile. We control for firm age (measured 
in years), as new ventures typically suffer from the liabilities of newness and the risks of failure 
are higher for young firms than older firms (Stinchcombe, 1965). Competing arguements based 
on a liability of adolescence, however suggest that the risk of failure is relatively low for very 
young firms due to support by external constituents and initial endowments. But when these 
initial resources become depleted, the failure hazard shoots up and then declines following the 
liabilities of newness pattern (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990).  
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We measure size by a firm’s number of full-time employees. According to Penrose’s 
theory of growth (1959), if a firm grows too fast by size, the entrepreneur or the management 
team of the firm may not be able to respond quickly enough and make necessary changes to the 
organization and management structure. The resulting mismatch between firm size and 
management structure may put the firm at risk of going bankrupt and lead to firm exit (Churchill 
and Lewis, 1983). 
R&D intensity is measured by the average percentage of R&D investment to total 
turnover for each firm during the last three years at the time of the survey (Deeds, 2001; Fontana 
and Nesta, 2009). Firms investing in R&D activities are more likely to generate new knowledge 
stocks and improved productivity growth which will increase the market value of the firm, and 
consequently the likelihood of survival (Hall, 1987).	 In knowledge intensive industries such as 
the biopharmaceuticals, a significant strategic commitment to R&D appears to be critical to the 
firm’s ability to develop competencies required to survive and succeed (Deeds, 2001). However 
over-capitalizing in R&D activities (above the optimal level of R&D) is risky to a firm’s 
continuous survival, as it increases uncertainty. Higher uncertainty generates a temporary 
slowdown and bounceback as firms postpone activity and wait for uncertainty to resolve (Boom, 
2006; 2007). This significantly reduces a firm’s responsiveness of R&D to changes in business 
conditions, such as major economic shocks. New establishments generally operate below the 
optimal level of R&D with no access to large R&D facilities (e.g. large R&D laboratories) unless 
through external partners such as large corporates and public research institutions (Mahmood, 
1997). In addition, it is very unlikely for a start-up biopharmaceutical firms to attract massive 
initial VC investment in basic R&D without staging, due to the high attrition rate and prolonged 
process of biopharmaceutical product development.  
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Next, as there may be significant institutional or environmental effects we use a dummy 
variable to control for EU-US differences (0=US, 1=EU) (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). We 
also control for new ventures access to venture capital funding, which may make a critical 
difference to their engagement with exploration or exploitation alliance activities. Firms backed 
by venture capital are more likely to capitalize on exploitation alliance activity and survive 
better, because they can call upon sufficient resources to pursue exploration activity (Niosi, 
2003). The variable takes a value of 1 if a new venture receives external funding from venture 
capitalists, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the strategic focus of biopharmaceutical firm represents an 
important factor for their survival and growth (i.e. Deeds and Hill, 1996; George et al., 2001; 
Maurer and Ebers, 2006). We measure this firm characteristic by two indicator variables, 
reflecting respectively whether a firm focuses on preclinical development and marketing and 
sales.  
Since our survey firms are relatively small companies in an emerging sector, there were 
no consistent secondary data sources that could provide an objective corroboration of some of 
the individual responses. Nevertheless, we sought to minimize common method bias by 
guaranteeing response anonymity, counterbalancing the question order and structuring the 
questionnaire to seperate  the measurements of predictor and criterion variables (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In addition, we conducted a Harman’s single-factor test of all variables in this study. 
Exploratory factor analysis shows a result of seven factors with eigenvalues greater than one 
with the first factor accounting for only 12 per cent of the total variance. Independent and 
dependent variables of each of our equations clearly loaded on different factors. These results 
indicate that common method bias is not substantially present in our data.  
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Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in our 
analysis. Table 4 reports the results from Competing Risk Modeling (CRM) of firm failure. 
Model 1 includes the control variables as well as the main effects for the crisis and the numbers 
of exploration and exploitation alliances. In Model 2, we add the interaction effects of the 
alliance variables with the crisis dummy. These interaction effects represent the effects of 
exploration and exploitation alliances on firm failure after the onset of the financial crisis. In 
Models 3 and 4, we include the effect of balance between exploration and exploitation alliances 
and then its interaction with the crisis dummy, to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.   
In terms of main effects of the alliance variables, in Model 1 we find the effect for crisis 
to be positive and marginally significant (β =.328, p < .10), indicating – as one would expect – 
that the risk of failure increases after the onset of the crisis. The effect of the number of 
exploration alliances is positive and marginally significant (β = .041, p < .10), while the effect of 
exploitation alliances is negative and marginally significant (β = - .043, p < .10). These results 
suggest that engagement in exploration alliances has a negative impact on firm survival, whereas 
engagement in exploitation alliances has a positive impact. In Model 3, the main effect for 
balance between exploration and exploitation alliances on the likelihood of failure is negative 
and marginally significant (β = - .464, p < .01), suggesting that this balance has a positive impact 
on survival.  
The interaction effects of the numbers of exploration and exploitation alliances and the 
balance between them with the crisis dummy enhance the above main effects in each case. In 
Model 2, the interaction between the number of exploration alliances and the crisis dummy is 
positive and marginally significant (β = .002, p < .10). It suggests that engaging in exploration 
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alliances leads to even higher likelihood of failure after the onset of the crisis. This result 
provides some support for Hypothesis 1. The interaction between the number of exploitation 
alliances and the crisis dummy is negative and significant (β = - .972, p < .05). It suggests that 
engaging in exploitation alliances leads to much lower likelihood of failure after the onset of the 
crisis. This result supports Hypothesis 2. Finally, in Model 4, the interaction effect of the balance 
between exploration and exploitation alliances and the crisis dummy is negative and significant 
(β = -2.241, p < .01). It suggests that maintaining a balance between the two types of alliance 
leads to lower likelihood of failure after the onset of the crisis. This result provides some support 
for Hypothesis 3a. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is rejected.  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2, 3 & 4 here 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Robustness Checks 
To verify the robustness of our results, we performed several additional analysis. First as we 
focus on two types of exit, failure (bankruptcy or liquidation) and M&A, which  can be treated as 
categorical outcomes, we re-estimated the previously examined relationships using an alternative 
multinominal logistic regression without separating the net effect of the Global Financial Crisis. 
The results suggest very similar patterns  to the competing risk models in Table 4.  
Second, an M&A can be a successful exit if it is valued well for the acquired company. 
However, it can also be an indication of firm failure if the M&A is hostile or extremely low-
valued, and the acquired company has to sell with little bargaining power. To rule out this type 
of M&A from our analysis, we have checked the M&A profiles of our respondent firms by 
looking for information on their valuations from various secondary sources, such as company 
websites, industry reports, business news and commentary. Our finding confirms that all the 19 
M&A deals included in our estimation are successful exits.  
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Third, to test whether the two forms of exit examined in this study can be treated as 
independent event, we estimated the hazard of each form of exit using a Cox proportionate 
model, and performed a Hausman test of the differences between these two outcomes. The 
results confirm the significant differences between exit by bankruptcy or liquidation (failure) and 
M&A.  
Fourth, we performed a robustness check on the consistency between our sample firms’ 
engagement with both types of alliances and their overall explorative and/or exploitative 
strategy9. The results show that our sample firms engagement with exploration alliances is highly 
correlated with their overall focus on the explorative dimension (β =0.787, p<0.01), likewise 
these firms’ engagement with exploitation alliances is highly correlated with an overall focus on 
the exploitative dimension (β =0.706, p<0.01). As an extension of this analysis, we have 
included a variable capturing the ratio of exploration to exploitation alliances in our estimation of 
new venture failure. The result confirms that the share of effort towards exploratory activity in a 
new venture’s alliance portfolio is a significant predictor of its failure under external shocks10.  
Fifth, to test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of period for the Global Financial 
Crisis, we conducted further analysis of our sample firms’ likelihood of failure during the years 
within and following the crisis. The results obtained in each year are consistent with our current 
results.  
Finally, it is important to recognize that firms with more exploitation alliance activities at 
the time of our initial survey in 2006 would naturally expect to be more advanced in their 
innovation. They are more likely to have products nearer to market, which will make it easier for 
																																																						
9 We operationalized firms’ overall focus on the explorative and exploitative dimensions in terms of two dummy 
variables (‘1’ stands for a focus on explorative or exploitative dimension, ‘0’ otherwise). In the original survey, we 
ruled out those firms whose overall focus was neither explorative nor exploitative dimensions. 
10 The results are available upon request. 
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such firms to obtain funding and therefore increase their likelihood of survive during external 
shocks. To test this potential effect, we included a count variable capturing a firm’s number of 
products at late stage development in our estimation. The results confirm that the possession of 
products nearer to market does not have a significant effect on our sample firms’ likelihood of 
failure during the Global Financial Crisis.  
 
Discussion 
Our aim in this paper has been to gain some understanding of how alliance behaviour relates to 
new venture survival under extraordinary and unanticipated short-term shocks. We did so in the 
context of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which afforded a natural experiment for the paper. 
The empirical results suggest that exploration alliances, i.e. those focused on longer-term product 
development, make firms more vulnerable to external shocks in the short term. In contrast, 
exploitation alliances, i.e. those aimed at leveraging existing knowledge and competencies, 
enable firms to withstand such shocks and thus ensure their short-term survival. Similarly, 
balancing both types of activities also enhances the likelihood of new venture survival in the 
short term. A number of implications are identified as follows. 
First, our study provides new insights into the relationship between exploration alliances 
and firms’ performance outcomes. Previous research has shown that firms using exploration 
alliances to identify market opportunities have higher performance, and this relationship is 
stronger both in unstable external environments and for smaller start-up firms (Marino et al., 
2008; Sarkar et al., 2001). Our finding of a negative relationship between exploration alliances 
and firm survival suggests that engaging in exploration alliances jeopardizes a new venture’s 
survival under sudden hostile external shocks such as the Global Financial Crisis. In other words, 
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exploring new products contributes to the biopharmaceutical firm’s future success however at the 
expense of its current viability. Moreover, we explicitly focus on an unexpected external shock 
in this study. Such shocks are rarely considered in theoretical accounts of firm survival and 
absent in the empirical literature as they are, by definition, unusual and unexpected. Successful 
strategy adaptation assumes knowing what the future business environment will look like, 
however the unpredictable and instant nature of such shocks makes it hard to envisage and 
prevent firms from making prompt adjustments. But to the extent that they are more prevalent – 
as recent work suggests (Krugman, 2008; Taleb, 2007) – our work suggests that long-term, risky 
endeavors such as exploration alliances should be complemented by initiatives to maintain firm 
viability in the short-term.  
Second, our study articulates the role of exploitation alliances as a compelling strategy 
for enduring survival. Previous studies suggest that exploitation alliances prevent firms from 
discovering new opportunities and reduce their future viability in the buoyant conditions (March, 
1991; Koza and Levin, 1998). However, the short-term performance benefits of such alliances 
have been largely overlooked, given that there is a wide variety of situations in which 
exploitation alliances can provide firms with distinctive resources considerations in the short 
term such as under the recession conditions, where market selection pressures are less forgiving 
than those in buoyant conditions. Our study extends this line of research by uncovering the 
exceptional short-term performance implications of exploitation alliances that can help 
contribute to the firm’s survival in the wake of short-term shocks (Barker III and Duhaime, 1997; 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992). More specifically, we shed light on this critical research gap by 
providing the rationale with empirical evidence for a positive relationship between exploitation 
alliances and firm survival under external shocks. Our finding suggests that engagement with 
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exploitation alliances enhances a start-up biopharmaceutical firm’s chance of survival under 
sudden hostile external shocks. When faced with a sudden shock, entrepreneurs must react 
quickly and decisively to ensure a firm’s continued viability because implementing small, 
incremental changes, even in large numbers, often will not produce changes necessary to adjust 
to new environmental realities (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).  
Moreover, our study highlights differences in the extent to which each type of alliance 
affects firm survival under external shocks. Specifically, in its absolute magnitude, the effect of 
exploitation alliances on new venture failure following the external shock is much greater than 
that of exploration alliances (-1.02 vs..02). This suggests that short-term shocks catalyse the 
value of exploitation alliances as a buffer for survival. In contrast, the increased likelihood of 
failure associated with exploration alliances, though relatively small in magnitude, is much less 
sensitive to the short-term shock. This suggests that in the aftermath of an external shock, 
survival is all down to whether a firm can latch on to the positive effect of exploitation alliances. 
Revenues generated through exploitation alliances can help new ventures to acquire valuable 
resources at bargain prices during the recession (Wan and Yiu, 2009), without being limited by 
the accompanying funding drought, and the high interest rates charged by most fund providers to 
compensate for greater uncertainty (Storey and Greene, 2010). This enables these firms to 
capture the emerging opportunities created by external shocks faster and more aggressively (Wan 
and Yiu, 2009; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). 
Finally, our study contributes to a growing understanding of alliance ambidexterity and 
the conditions for such strategies to flourish. In line with the previous research on alliance 
ambidexterity (Cao et al., 2009; Hill and Birkenshaw, 2014; He and Wong, 2004), our finding 
confirms that maintaining a balance between exploration and exploitation alliance activities is of 
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pivotal importance to a new venture’s survival. The dangers that external shocks present are 
usually overlooked in the light of the possible opportunities they create. Prior work on the 
balance between exploration and exploitation in alliance formation emphasizes its importance on 
the basis of ensuring long-term survival (Hill and Birkenshaw, 2014; Lavie et al., 2011; Gupta et 
al., 2006). Our study complements this body of research by underscoring the merits of balancing 
exploration and exploitation alliance activities in contributing to firms’ short-term survival under 
sudden hostile shocks. Previous literature on firm performance draws a clear line between 
strategies that are beneficial to long-term performance and those contribute to short-term 
viability (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). Given that the long-term performance 
contributions of balancing exploration and exploitation alliances are well documented (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Hill and Birkenshaw, 2014), we are able to demonstrate that there are 
strategies that can help not only sustain the firm’s performance growth but also contribute to its 
survival in the wake of short-term shocks.   
However, our analysis further suggests that overdependence on either type of alliance 
activity under external shocks may lead a new venture to lose either its continued viability or 
emerging opportunities that could potentially contribute to its future viability. As evidenced by 
our robustness check, alliance portfolio with a stronger orientation on exploration activity makes 
a new venture more vulnerable to short-term shocks. Balancing exploration and exploitation 
within the alliance portfolio therefore helps a new venture effectively tackle both sides of an 
external shock and enhances its chance of survival. From an organizational learning perspective, 
to identify opportunities emerged from external shocks with the potential for exploitation, a new 
venture needs to possess sufficient absorptive capacity to identify and evaluate new opportunities. 
The foundations for these activities reside in the existing knowledge and competence bases 
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which can be built through its exploration alliance activity (Hill and Birkenshaw, 2014). 
Likewise, a number of studies show that the slack resources generated through engaging in 
exploitation alliance activity can provide crucial resources for new ventures to better capture 
emerging opportunities more aggressively in an external shock (Wan and Yiu, 2009; Cheng and 
Kesner, 1997; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988).  
Reflecting further on our results opens up research possibilities that we have not been 
able to explore in our data. The first research possibility relates to the new venture’s exposure to 
uncertainty arising from a partner’s future behaviour. It may be challenging to accommodate 
each partner’s internal threat rigidity and failing to do so may hinder their joint response to 
increasing environmental threats (Marino et al., 2002). Over-relying on partners may lead to 
power imbalance, in particular when a new venture collaborates with large established firms. It is 
likely that external shocks may amplify a new venture’s relational risks if the firm is overly 
dependent on one or a set of partners, who fail due to external shocks. Second, from the 
viewpoint of relational capital, in the event of a crisis and tightening resources, it is questionable 
whether another firm is really likely to make available its limited number of resources to a 
partner firm ‘instantly’. These issues raise an interesting direction for future research to study 
alliance behaviors under external shocks while controlling for relational dependence, power, and 
duration of the relationship up to the point of crisis. 
Limitations 
Our study is however subject to a number of limitations. First due to the limitation of our 
data, we can only study exploration and exploitation within the function domain of alliance 
formation. We are also unable to identify the length of each individual alliance, as it is possible 
that some of the alliances are entered in the final stage when the survey was conducted and 
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resolve before the external shock. Future studies should test the robustness of our findings across 
different domains of alliance formation, such as the structure and attribute domains while 
controlling for the length of each alliance.  
Similarly, we measure alliance activity by counting exploration and exploitation alliances, 
given the difficulties of measuring the value of alliance activity. So many alliance benefits are 
indirect, what matters most may not be the balance between direct alliance input and output but 
the impact of the alliance on the competitive standing of each partner and the strategic options 
made available or foreclose (Doz and Hamel, 1998). Therefore some alliance value can be 
measured directly, but other benefits may go into partners’ ledgers in a furtive manner. These 
may be intangible and difficult to link with the activities of the alliance, but they are real 
nevertheless (Doz and Hamel, 1998). Future research should attempt to go beyond simple count 
measures to develop alliance activity measures that reflect its quality and value more accurately. 
More in-depth understanding of  value creation and value appropriation in strategic alliances is 
critical for developing measures for  the value of alliance activities.  
Second, our analysis is based on the biopharmaceutical sector, a sector that is often 
regarded as having distinct characteristics. In particular, our definition of new ventures as firms 
less than ten years old – may not be compatitable with new ventures in industries where the new 
product development and/or approval window is relatively short, such as the software industry. 
Therefore, before attempting wider generalization, other studies could usefully be undertaken in 
an attempt to generalize our results to other industries, such as the telecommunication and 
semiconductor industries. Finally further exploration of the positive impact of exploitation 
alliances on firm survival is clearly needed, as our study provides little insight into the behavioral 
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processes underlying this effect under external shocks. This will also help entrepreneurs enhance 
their strategic planning to prevent failure in the event of sudden hostile external shocks.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study represents a step in the direction of acknowledging “business as 
usual” not as tucked away from the improbable extremities of a normal distribution but as 
subject to sizeable probability of short-term shocks. The natural experiment afforded by the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 enabled us to examine how the strategic choices of firms in 2006 
– unsuspecting of what was to come – had significant consequences, both positive and negative, 
for firm survival in the wake of the crisis. It suggests that theory and the body of evidence on the 
performance consequences of strategic behaviors should be sensitive to the unknown but real 
dangers of the short-term. In specific, when prompt adaptation becomes unviable due to the 
unknown and instant nature of such shocks, it is likely that businesses may fail before even 
realizing their arrival and/or possible impact. To fully capture the opportunity and avoid the 
dangers external shocks present, the occurrence of such events should be controlled in the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of certain strategies before making a strategic choice. Our 
findings suggest that exploration alliances with a long-term orientation make firms more 
vulnerable to external shocks, whereas exploitation alliances as well as a balance between 
exploration and exploitation alliances – which underlie short-term performance – enable these 
firms to sustain external shocks.  
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Table 1 
Basic Descriptives of the Sample Firms 
	
																		
 
 
 
 
Variable 
All firms US EU UK France Germany  
N=155 N=47 N=108 N=44 N=24 N=40 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
No. of  Exploitation  Alliances     2.26 7.45 2.05 2.78 2.36 8.83 3.55 12.60 1.57 4.32 1.31 3.26 
No. of  Exploration Alliance     2.88 3.93 3.16 3.18 2.75 4.25 2.60 3.53 2.57 2.13 3.06 5.91 
Sales Growth (% pa) 0.90 1.63 0.93 1.84 0.89 1.57 1.15 2.11 0.83 1.19 0.66 1.08 
Exit 0.19 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.43 0.13 0.34 
Control  
            R&D Intensity                              0.58 0.31 0.66 0.27 0.54 0.33 0.55 0.35 0.60 0.33 0.49 0.30 
No. of Employees                        20.14 23.12 28.46 27.56 16.60 20.05 12.84 16.71 19.81 25.12 18.76 19.58 
Firm Age (by2006)                                     6.26 2.16 6.38 2.19 6.20 2.16 6.50 2.17 6.00 2.21 6.00 2.12 
Market focus 
            Regional Market 0.80 0.40 0.78 0.42 0.81 0.40 0.80 0.41 0.85 0.37 0.79 0.41 
Foreign Market 0.47 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.64 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.37 0.49 
External Market 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.27 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.47 0.11 0.31 
Strategic focus 
            Primary Activity: R&D and 
Preclinical Dev. 0.75 0.44 0.91 0.28 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.73 0.45 0.63 0.49 
Primary Activity: Marketing and 
Sales            0.43 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.29 0.46 0.53 0.51 
VC Funding  0.57 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.54    0.51 0.48 0.51 0.62 0.50 
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Table 2 
 Basic Descriptives by Exit Type 
 
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Note:  ⁺	ρ <0.1; * ρ <.05; ** ρ <.01 
 
 
 
 
aComparison between survival and exit firms. 
bComparison between firms experienced bankrupt and liquidation and M&A. 
Variable 
Survival 
N=125 
Exita 
N=30 
M&Ab 
N=19 
Bankrupt&Liquidationb 
N=11 
Mean S.D. Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. Mean  S.D. 
No. of  Exploitation Alliances 2.19 7.87 2.58  5.36 3.25  6.49 1.50  2.76 
No. of  Exploration  Alliances 2.66 3.72 3.79 
 
4.67 4.44 
 
5.52 2.60 
 
2.32 
Alliance Balance 0.30 0.42 0.29 * 0.40 0.32  0.44 0.24  0.35 
Sales Growth  0.93 1.75 0.75 
 
0.98 0.76 
 
0.74 0.71 
 
1.56 
Firm Characteristics 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 R&D Intensity                              0.57 0.30 0.59 
 
0.36 0.61 
 
0.33 0.54 
 
0.44 
No. of Employees                        18.00 20.20 31.00 ** 31.04 37.00   36.65 20.00   13.34 
Firm Age (by2006)                                     6.19 2.16 6.53 
 
2.18 6.47 
 
2.25 6.64 
 
2.16 
Market Focus 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
Regional Market 0.81 0.40 0.76 
 
0.44 0.74 
 
0.45 0.80 
 
0.42 
Foreign Market 0.45 0.50 0.59 ** 0.50 0.53 
 
0.51 0.70 
 
0.48 
External Market 0.28 0.45 0.33 
 
0.48 0.32 
 
0.48 0.36 
 
0.50 
Strategic Focus            
Primary Activity: R&D and Preclinical Dev. 0.74 0.44 0.77 
 
0.43 0.74 
 
0.45 0.82 
 
0.40 
Primary Activity: Marketing and Sales            0.48 0.50 0.23 ** 0.43 0.26 
 
0.45 0.18 
 
0.40 
VC Funding  0.55 0.50 0.66  0.48 0.58 
 
0.51 0.80 
 
0.42 
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Table 3 
 Correlation Matrix (N = 155) 
 
Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. No. of Exploration Alliances 1 
 
 
      
  
2. No. of Exploitation Alliances 0.526 1  
      
  
3. Alliance Balance 0.367 0.548 1         
4. R&D Intensity                              0.172 0.021 0.141 1 
     
  
5. Sales Growth -0.146 -0.086 -0.028 -0.240 1 
    
  
6. Firm Age  0.107 0.162 0.048 -0.021 0.057 1 
   
  
7. Nationality -0.073 -0.014 -0.055 -0.089 -0.013 0.132 1 
  
  
8. Primary Activity: R&D and Preclinical Dev.  0.210 -0.019 0.011 0.225 -0.338 -0.014 -0.160 1 
 
  
9. Primary Activity: Marketing and Sales            0.155 0.126 0.088 -0.315 0.268 0.049 0.003 -0.433 1   
10.VC  Funding  0.044 0.084 0.053 0.063 -0.197 0.036 -0.053 0.254 -0.199  1  
11. No of Employees 0.291 0.249 0.103 -0.005 0.034 0.269 -0.141 0.146 0.055 0.209 1 
 
Notes:  Correlations with absolute values greater than .21 are significant at p < .05
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Table 4 
 Competing Risk Regression of New Venture Failure 
 
Note: ⁺ ρ <.1; * ρ <.05; ** ρ <.01; N=298.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Exit by Bankruptcy or 
Liquidation 
Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)  Model (4)  
Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  
Crisis Dummy 0.256 ⁺ 0.608 ⁺ 0.222 ⁺ 0.264 ⁺ 
No of Exploration Alliances 0.044 ⁺ 0.018 ⁺    
No of Exploitation Alliances -0.037 ⁺ -0.052 ⁺    
No of Exploration Alliances*Crisis Dummy   0. 002 ⁺    
No of Exploitation Alliances*Crisis Dummy   -0.970 *    
Alliance Balance   -0.504 ⁺ -0.158 ** 
Alliance Balance* Crisis Dummy     -2.014 ** 
Controls        
Firm characteristics      
R&D Intensity -1.703 ⁺ -1.831 * -1.558 ⁺ -1.502 ⁺ 
Firm Age 0.121 * 0.127 * 0.119 * 0.118 * 
No of Employees -0.015 	 -0.016 	 0.119  -0.012  
VC Funding  0.849 	 0.743 	 0.834  0.805  
Nationality (EU=1/US=0) 0.148  0.211  -0.149  0.162  
Strategic focus      
Preclinical Dev. 0.372  0.361  0.366  0.387  
Marketing and Sales -1.195 ⁺ -1.639 ⁺ -1.055 ⁺ -1.044 ⁺ 
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Appendix. Variable Table 
	
Variable name Measurement 
No. of  Exploitation Alliances	
A firm’s number of marketing based partnerships that focus on 
clinical trials, FDA regulatory process, marketing and sales 
activities 
No. of  Exploration  Alliances	 A firm’s number of R&D based partnerships  that focus on basic research, drug discovery and preclinical development 
Alliance Balance 
The multiplicative interaction of exploration and exploitation 
alliance activities divided by the average number of exploration / 
exploitation alliances 
Global financial crisis A dummy variable reflecting the periods before and after September 2008 when the global financial crisis started  
Control variables 
R&D Intensity                             	 R&D investment as a percentage of its total turnover 
No. of Employees                       	 Number of full-time employees per firm 
Firm Age (by2006)                                    	Firm age measured in years 
Regional Market	 Firms sell in regional market (Dummy) 
Foreign Market	 Firms sell in foreign market (Dummy) 
External Market	 Firms sell in external market (Dummy) 
Primary Activity: R&D and 
Preclinical Dev.	
Firms engage in R&D and preclinical development (Dummy) 
Primary Activity: Marketing and 
Sales           	
Firms engage in marketing and sales activities (Dummy) 
Nationality Firms that are originally from either the US or Europe (Dummy) 
VC Funding  Firms that received external funding from venture captialists 
(Dummy) 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
